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# Interview with C. Roberts Moore

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR C. ROBERTS MOORE

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*Q: Ambassador, I'd like to start off the interview, if you don't mind, by having you give us some idea of your background, the part of the country in which you were raised, a bit about your education, and perhaps lead up to why you went into the Foreign Service, and perhaps how you prepared yourself to go into the Foreign Service. Would that be a good beginning?*

MOORE: All right. That's fine. I'm always very pleased to talk about my origins, because I came from a small town in the Middle West, which was called Galena, Illinois, which is where General U.S. Grant came from. I used to deliver newspapers to the residence where he lived, obviously many years after.

I graduated from Galena High School class of '31, and then had an abrupt change in my life by finding myself in Turkey, attending Roberts College, which is an old American institution founded in 1863. I went there in 1931, because I had an uncle who was teaching, and who had been teaching off and on there since 1904. He thought it would be an excellent idea for me to have my first year in college at Roberts College. So I had a summer of travel at the age of 15 and 16 in Europe, much of it by myself, and then went

down to start a school year in Istanbul, which just a few years before that had been called Constantinople.

I had a wonderful two years there. I stayed on an extra year. I had a lot of traveling. I traveled all over Asia Minor on truck and bus and trains, sleeping in primitive quarters. I must say that it stood me in good stead, because ever since I have never encountered a lodging situation that I was not prepared to accept, simply because I had undergone some of these experiences much earlier.

During one of the summers, I attended the University of Berlin in Germany in 1933, I think it was, when Hitler had come to power. So I saw something of the Hitler Germany and the reaction of people to the installation of that regime.

Then I went on to Harvard and had my last two years at Harvard College, graduated in 1935. I started off my life in New York Bank and worked there for almost eight years, rather contentedly, expecting to spend the rest of my working life in banking. Happily for me—unfortunately, not for others—the war brought about a change in my plans. I might say that while I was working at the New York Bank, I went to night school at New York University, and obtained my master's degree in economics, which, again, not for the knowledge, but for the degree, was to stand me in good stead for a job that I ultimately got in Washington. So I think that pretty well brings me to the first phase of my life, my pre-Foreign Service life, although obviously the two years spent in Turkey had a great deal to do with the decision later on to enter the Foreign Service.

In 1943, I had tried to get into the Navy and had been honorably discharged with a medical discharge, after really not serving at all. I decided that I really ought to do something in the war effort, and I went to Washington and found a job with the Lend-Lease Administration. Turkey was a lend-lease country. I ran into the director for Turkey, who was looking for an assistant, and as I had experience, one of the few people who did, even though it dated

back to my early teens, it was the factor that enabled me to get a rather good job with the Lend-Lease Administration.

Ultimately, I went on to Turkey at the end of 1943, and I was to remain there until the end of 1948. While there, Lend-lease became the Foreign Economic Administration, another organization that I continued to work with. I was also, simply because everybody else had left at the close of the war, in charge of the U.S. Commercial Company, which was engaged in preclusive buying in order to keep various strategic commodities out of the hands of the Germans, and also was the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner's representative. I had to liquidate the lend-lease and other remaining assets of the war agencies in Turkey.

In 1947, as the result of a special law which permitted the Department to take in, I think, 200 officers or people who had served in other agencies during the war under the so-called Manpower Act, I applied to enter the Foreign Service, took the orals—happily, I didn't have to take the written—and came into the legitimate Foreign Service in 1947, and returned to Turkey as a second secretary.

In entering the Foreign Service, I took a tremendous cut in salary, but it was all very worth it, because the other wartime jobs were coming to an end, and this provided a career ladder that I found very attractive. I might even mention that I married my wife in the same year, in Ankara, Turkey, and happily, she being the daughter of a foreign diplomat, was very used to the Foreign Service life. So our involvement in the Foreign Service was a very easy transition to make.

From Turkey, not too strangely, I came back to Washington in 1949 and remained until mid-1952, serving as Turkish desk officer for most of that time. It was a fascinating period because it was then that Turkey came into NATO, Turkish forces were one of our principal allies in the Korean War, and our relations with Turkey were becoming certainly closer than any of us had dreamed would be possible.

I spent three years in that particular job and then went on to Paris, the only post I've had in the developed world. But even there I was dealing with the developing world, the Middle East and Africa. Again, that was an opportunity to see what was happening in the period of decolonization from the point of view of the mother country.

After three years in Paris, I spent a year at the National War College. In 1956, I returned to Turkey once again to become economic counselor and deputy AID director. I think it was called USOM (U.S. Operations Mission) at that time. This was, in a sense, not an enviable position, because the embassy wasn't particularly happy to have me working on the AID side, and the AID side felt a little bit uneasy with me as sort of an interloper from the embassy. But happily, we worked well together, and it was a useful experience, although I think shortly thereafter, this experiment of combining the two posts, economic counselor and deputy AID director, was found not to be very satisfactory.

From Turkey I made a direct transfer to Cambodia, where I was the deputy chief of mission. That, again, was a fascinating post, and certainly after having spent a large part of my adult life dealing with Turkey, represented quite a significant change in area and in mentality of the people with which I would be dealing. We had many adventures in Cambodia, many memorable adventures, and while there were many tough moments, again it was a satisfying and fascinating post.

After Cambodia, another direct transfer to Syria in 1962, where I was also to be deputy chief of mission. I remained there until 1965, when I found myself named as ambassador to Mali. I recall appearing before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate, having Senator Fulbright ask me if I had asked for Mali. I told him that I hadn't, that I went where I was told to go. And I never for a moment regretted it.

After three years in Mali, I returned to Washington as senior deputy assistant secretary, working under Joe Palmer and then later David Newsom in the Bureau of African Affairs. As a last post in 1972, I was assigned as ambassador to Cameroon, and concurrently

as ambassador to Equatorial Guinea. I never lived in the latter country. In fact, at the beginning of my stay in Cameroon as we had decided to completely close up our very, very small mission in Equatorial Guinea, but I did go there for periodic ceremonies and just to maintain some kind of contact with a country whose leader was a ruthless dictator, and who ultimately met an unhappy but perhaps well deserved end.

So that's more or less my career. I retired in 1975. I didn't give up completely. I had a couple of special inspection jobs after I retired, one as co-chairman of a joint Commerce-State Department inspection team looking into the commercial services rendered by our two departments. Also, in 1976 or 1977, I was head of an inspection team, inspecting Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Papua, New Guinea. I think I probably took on that latter assignment primarily because I'd never been to southern Asia, and I thought that this would be a good opportunity to become acquainted with that area at government expense. So as I say, this is more or less my career.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, you have served in Africa, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in the Far East. Perhaps you could tell us a bit about the difficulties you had in these various parts of the world and how they differed, and what some of your problems were. Would you mind doing that?*

MOORE: Yes, there are certain common threads, but there are many, many differences. The common thread, I guess, is that they were all, particularly the newly emerging countries that had just obtained their independence—I'm speaking primarily of Africa—very sensitive to any suggestion that they weren't equals, at least political equals.

I might speak first of Turkey, because that's where my experience has been most prolonged. Turkey, of course, has existed as country with a government for over 800 years. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it passed through a period where as the Ottoman Empire, it was known as the “Sick Man of Europe” and had to submit to various infringements of its sovereignty in order to survive, but it did survive. The revolutionary

regime that took over in 1923, with the new boundaries of Turkey, as a much more heterogeneous state, became very sensitive about its independence and recognition of its independence, and very proud in the spirit which was fostered by Ataturk, very proud of Turkish nationality. Every Turk was very proud of being a Turk and encouraged to be proud to be a Turk. But with the result that sometimes slights which were not intended became quite serious.

I recall that Webster's Dictionary was ordered out of the Roberts College library by the minister of education because it contained an offensive definition of a Turk. It seems that one of the definitions given, not certainly one of the favorite definitions, but a secondary definition, was “a licentious person.” Some student saw this in the dictionary, reported it to the ministry, and the ministry ordered the dictionary to be removed.

Another time, a professor at Roberts College took friends around to see the old walls that surrounded Constantinople, took a picture of his son and a Turkish boy with their arms around a donkey, and underneath it, he entitled it “three friends.” A Turkish student at the college saw this picture in the album, reported it to the authorities, by then he was away on leave and was not allowed to return to Roberts College. Finally, it was settled after many, many months of absence. Of course, speaking of a Turk in relation to a donkey is certainly a very offensive suggestion, but, of course, his meaning in showing “three friends” was entirely an innocent one and a friendly one.

But it does show how sensitive countries can be, which was a very good experience for me, because I appreciated at a very young age - I was then 16 or 17, with classmates of 20 different nationalities - that one had to be very careful not to tread on the particular nationalist sentiments of one's colleagues. I found this in very good stead in other parts of the world where I served. I think I came to realize, no matter where I was, that many of these countries are, in a sense, looking for any slight that suggests that you don't consider them your equal, or that you're looking down upon them.

Cambodia, again, was another problem. There, again, we had a monarchy, a very colorful monarchy, with a very colorful head of government, Prince [Norodom] Sihanouk. He had been king, but had abdicated in favor of his father in order to take a more active political life. Our relations with him were always either going up or going down. We knew that they would never be stable. If things were going very well, we would say, “This can't last.” If things were going very badly, we would say, “Well, after the Prince has gone off to his annual cure in France, we'll probably get along very much better.”

I learned there, I think, the lesson of confidentiality. We would try to talk to the Prince, in an exploratory way, about ways in which relations with Vietnam and Cambodia might be improved. There were constant border incursions that were as a result of the war in Vietnam that were creating problems between Vietnam and Cambodia, and between Cambodia and ourselves. But the next day, the conversation would be completely reported in the local newspaper, which the Prince directed. So the importance of being able to talk to someone on a basis of confidentiality became highlighted, and the difficulty of conducting affairs when you really can't have an informal exchange, just to explore possibilities, when this has been ruled out by one side's inability to exercise some restraint.

Particularly in a country like Mali, which was a socialist regime, the problem there was to get along with a regime where the by-word was “down with the imperialists, the colonialists, the neo-colonialists.” We had one newspaper in town and one daily broadcast on national radio, in which some minister or some editorialist was always berating the imperialists, colonialists, and the neo-colonialists, and it was made perfectly clear that we were being considered as being in that category. Having undergone these experiences in Cambodia, as well as in Syria, I was somewhat inured to this bombardment of slurs, in a sense, and didn't react every time it happened. In fact, I think if I had, my reactions or the ability to do anything about it would have been very much impaired. But if things began to get too bad over a period of time, I would go to the president and complain and cite the examples. Generally, he would order somebody, the minister of information or the

local newspaper editor, to tone down the commentary. Then, of course, in due course, the process would repeat itself. But I think one learns to take some of these things. Happily, we discovered, in most every instance, that the population as such seemed to be basically unaffected by these invectives.

We were able to travel around the country and encountered a friendly reception wherever we went, and it was almost as if these daily broadcasts didn't sink in or didn't seem, however, to apply when individuals were concerned. Happily, that was our experience.

In some of the countries we had a very strong bloc presence, particularly in Cambodia and in Mali. In Mali, there were only three Western embassies, the American, the French, and the Germans, but at least 20 of the bloc countries were represented, including such friends of the United States as Cuba, North Korea, and North Vietnam.

The deanship of the diplomatic corps revolved, of course, among all of the chiefs of mission, depending upon their seniority. Most of the time that I was there, we had either poor or no relations with the country of the acting dean, which meant that he did not communicate with us directly, and the protocol office of the foreign ministry would have to pass on all messages concerning the diplomatic corps to us, rather than through the dean of the diplomatic corps.

I remember one time attending a reception shortly after I arrived, when all of the chiefs of mission were gathered at the presidency, and I shook hands with everybody, including the North Korean ambassador, who smiled at me and shook hands. Then I suddenly looked back and saw a look of horror on his face, as he realized he'd shaken hands with the American ambassador. But this was all part of the game. Receptions were fun to go to, to watch which bloc members sat with which other bloc members, which apparently were trying to keep some distance. We had lots of interesting, sort of fun experiences of that kind.

I recall once when the Russians had invited all of the bloc chiefs of mission to attend some festival at the embassy, including the Yugoslav ambassador and his wife. At the end the Soviet Ambassador proposed a toast to Kim Il-Sung, the North Korean president, whose birthday it was then. Of course, immediately everybody rose with their glasses, except the Yugoslav ambassador and his wife, who were seated at opposite ends of the room and had no communication with each other. Yugoslavia had no relations with Kim Il-Sung and didn't get along with him, and they simply defied everybody else and resolutely remained in their seats. But this is what we were sensitive to in a small community like Bamako, the capital of Mali. Many of these situations were only of symbolic interest but kept the pot boiling.

I think I do have to speak a bit about economic development and the problems that we encountered in the various countries because they did differ. Turkey, happily, was able to find itself included in the Marshall Plan, after originally being omitted. There, the first program that we had was a program of creating a highway department, with the help of the Public Highway Service in the United States.

I returned to Turkey last September and was absolutely startled at the development of the road system, which was the outgrowth of that first effort on our part to develop a modern highway organization in Turkey that could plan and carry out road improvement and road development. But it is I think, one of the most lasting and useful things that we performed in the economic field for Turkey, opening up a rich country, in which many isolated areas had virtually no access to markets, either abroad or in the urban centers of Turkey.

But Turkey was an easier matter. Our only problem was that the Turkish Government had its own ideas of how it wanted its economic development money spent, and we felt many of these ideas were unsound. So there was a constant negotiation required to work out programs that we could both accept.

When you get to a country such as Mali, one of the poorest of the poor countries of the world, with a per capita income even today of considerably less than $200, and with no trained manpower, with staggering health problems (debilitating and endemic diseases including malaria, bilharzia and filariasis) and with an uneducated population, with a literacy rate of less than 10%, how can you translate your aid into projects that are going to bring about improvement in the lot of the average Malian? It was very difficult to deal with anybody in the government below the level of the secretary general of a minister, simply because they weren't equipped, either educationally or, let's say, psychologically, to deal with problems that required responsibility and decisions. So the decision making, getting answers, was always a time-consuming process.

I recall again, in Mali, an interesting situation. We had agreed to give Mali a few million dollars to build a normal school. We had a very prominent firm of American architects design this school. It was beautifully designed. We insisted, of course, on asking the Malians to examine the plans, to give us their suggestions as to what ought to be done, and tried to involve them in the whole process. Well, the result was that three years after my arrival the project was still pending. In the meantime, the Chinese had come in, built a textile factory, had it opened and operating, and we still hadn't turned the first shovel on our school. But the Chinese simply provided the entire complex without bothering or troubling the Malians to get their views on whether the construction ideas were sound or not. I think our idea was sound, the idea of involving the local people in a project, except for the fact that there were only two or three people in the entire ministry capable of dealing with projects of this kind. All of the countries, the bloc and other countries, were absolutely overwhelming it with projects that they had to look over and approve, as a result of which, of course, the process was very much slowed up.

There was something to be gained, perhaps, in the delay of that particular project, because later, before it was completed, we began to realize that the maintenance on the buildings that we had in mind would have been so great that the Malians would have never

been able to meet it out of their budget. We ended up by building a much smaller and perhaps better planned, architecturally less exciting building. So one had to realize that you couldn't develop a project in isolation; one had to think also in terms of what the local government was going to be able to support in meeting the local costs, not only the costs of starting the project, because usually we wanted to have some participation on their side, but in keeping up the project once we had left. Very often, some of these countries simply didn't have the means to do this.

This was particularly evident in road building, where we could build roads and did build some fine roads to connect countries together, but the ability of the country to maintain those roads, to exercise sufficient discipline over truck drivers so that overweight in trucks didn't destroy the roads, was more than these countries were really able to take care of, at least in the least developed of the developing countries.

I served mainly in French-speaking posts, countries that had either been colonies or, in effect, protectorates, where French influence was very strong. So one also had to realize that the officials of bureaucracy in those countries, having largely been trained by the French, had a certain approach to governing and approach to dealing with others that we had to adapt to. I think diplomats, people in my position in the English-speaking world, perhaps had a somewhat different problem, because we were more used to the English-influenced mentality. But again, in all of the French-speaking countries, there was a very heavy bureaucracy, a very slow bureaucratic process in getting approvals or working with any of the ministries. I always said to my staff that two qualities were extremely important in the developing world and certainly in the French-speaking world - patience and perseverance. If you kept at something long enough and persevered enough, generally speaking, you could get the result that you were after.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, I believe you served in Equatorial Guinea, as well. We don't hear as much about Equatorial Guinea around here. Perhaps you could tell us something of your experiences there and your relationship with that country.*

MOORE: Equatorial Guinea was a Spanish colony, the only one, certainly, in Africa south of the Sahara. Equatorial Guinea comprised two areas, the island of Fernando Po, just off the coast of Cameroon and Gabon, and on the mainland, a little enclave called Rio Muni, between Cameroon and Gabon. obtained its independence, I think, in late '68. I remember in 1969, on January 20th, when President Nixon was being inaugurated, suddenly there appeared—uninvited and unexpected—the foreign minister of Equatorial Guinea.

Actually, we had a great interest in Equatorial Guinea at that time, because it was one of the areas from which relief planes carried relief supplies for the Biafrans during the Nigerian civil war. They were threatening—in fact, they did deny, after they got independence, the use of Fernando Po for these so-called mercy flights. We were trying to develop a relationship with Equatorial Guinea that might permit these flights to resume.

So the foreign minister's presence was a fact, and we had to do something about him. I think they finally seated him in the press section of the inauguration area, because no chiefs of state or foreign ministers or foreign diplomats had been invited, only the resident ambassadors of the various countries. The foreign minister of Equatorial Guinea was the first one to have an appointment with the new Secretary of State, William Rogers, who again, because of our interest in the Biafra situation, courted this unexpected meeting on January 20, just after the ceremonies. However, the Secretary, I think, was probably pretty shocked to learn a couple of weeks later that the foreign minister, upon his return to his capital had been defenestrated - pushed out of the window and killed. That was the end of him, and, I suppose, the start of a relationship that never was and could not be very satisfactory.

It was a very dictatorial regime that became increasingly oppressive. A third, at least, of its population was in exile, escaped from the island, and the then-president, Masie, was ruthless in putting down any opposition whatsoever. Again, of course, he was very nationalist. He acted in such a way as to evict, eject the Nigerian workers that were responsible for the cocoa harvest on the island of Fernando Po, and as a matter of fact,

it was perhaps the very highest quality processed cocoa that one could find. He tried to replace these Nigerian workers with workers from the mainland of Rio Muni, who were completely unadapted and uninterested in working on cocoa plantations. So the economic base of the country was pretty well destroyed. The ability to export and to obtain export earnings to finance imports disappeared. His whole policy was really one that was destroying what had been a lovely little colony, a beautiful island, Before independence, it was a wonderful resort area for countries in that neighborhood.

We had a rather unfortunate situation there because in 1971 or early '72, our charg# d'affaires murdered his administrative assistant, the only other American in the embassy. We decided then that we really had no interests in Equatorial Guinea that required a presence there. So for some years thereafter ambassadors accredited to Yaounde, Cameroon, were also accredited to Equatorial Guinea. We made periodic trips to the mainland or to the island to attend national days or special ceremonies.

Generally, I must say that sometimes these ruthless leaders, as long as you're not their victim, can be rather engaging people. President Masie was a very simple person and really seemed to be quite straightforward when you talked to him. It was hard to believe that he could have been guilty of all of the crimes that he was accused of, but I guess there could be no doubt of it whatsoever.

I think that we did reopen a mission there a few years ago after he was overthrown, largely on the encouragement of the Spaniards who wanted to see a stronger Western presence there in order to encourage the new regime to work towards a better economic and political relationship with the Western world.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, would you say that you had a favorite post or a favorite set of duties during your Foreign Service career?*

MOORE: I know this is a question that one is always asked, “Which was your favorite post?” I think that I would really find it very difficult to name one. I think each post had

its particular charm and its particular difficulties, but there's not one assignment which I afterwards did not feel was a satisfying one. Generally speaking, the countries that I went to were not countries that officers sought out.

But I should mention, for example, a country like Mali, a small post. Of the officers that served there during my period of three years, between '65 and '68, at least seven have gone on to obtain chief of mission status. So I suppose that I would be inclined to encourage young officers not to shy away from some of these small posts. I think one can gain a tremendous amount of experience in some of these areas where personal relationships, as well as hardships and the unavailability, let's say, of the luxuries of life, help you meet the crises and the problems that develop later on.

I suspect that Cambodia was the most colorful of the posts that we went to. Again, we always had an uncertain relationship with Prince Sihanouk. He was generally the head of government. He had abdicated as king, having been put on the throne by the French. He had abdicated in favor of his father, so that he could take a more active political role. He was, again, a strong nationalist, thinking almost exclusively in terms of what some course of action meant for Cambodia. I suppose we felt offended sometimes when some of the things that we may have proposed or suggested that he do were rejected, but I always felt convinced that he was thinking, as seems quite natural, of Cambodia and not of whether something would please the United States.

I always remember attending a ceremony where he had invited the chiefs of mission. I was charg# d'affaires at that particular time. We had the Russian there, and we had the French there, and we had the Vietnamese representatives there. Sihanouk made two statements, I remember, with his high-pitched giggle, saying in front of the French and Russian ambassadors, “Now when we send our students to Russia, they all come back non-communists, and when we send our students to Paris, they go to the Place Pigalle and they all become communists.” He tittered and thought that was very funny. Then he told the Vietnamese representative in the assembled group that when the Vietnam

War was over, if Vietnam should ever be united, that would be the end of Cambodia. Vietnam would simply devour Cambodia, as it had tried to do centuries in the past. So he, I think, had a good vision of the fate of his country, but what he really hoped to do was to maintain a Cambodian identity, even though he realized, I think, that Cambodia could never be completely independent and free from foreign influences. It was also a very colorful country.

His father, the king, died while we were there, and the funeral ceremony was something that I suppose will never be seen again. It was held six months after his death. His body and bones were encased in an urn of mercury, which was placed on a wooden dragon, a huge 30- or 40-foot dragon, preceded by elephants, and the ancient Cambodian costumes, as they paraded through the city, ending up at the funeral bier, where the fire was set, and the urn and the bones and the body consumed. USIS took film of this particular ceremony and the ceremony that proceeded the next morning when the royal family went to the site of the cremation, and then selected charred bones of the deceased king to be put in various smaller urns, one to be thrown in the Mekong River, another to be put in a stupa, a tomb, memorializing his life. I forget where the third was supposed to go, but it was amusing, because one of the princesses, as filmed, picked up one bone, looked at it, didn't like it, threw it back, and took another. All of this is preserved on the film. The unfortunate fact is that under congressional limitations, USIS is not permitted to show these films in the United States. It's a great pity, because these are ceremonies that will never be repeated.

As I say, it was a colorful regime. Also, one had to get used to daily changes in the attitude of the Prince towards us, because he was convinced that there were two American policies. One was that of the embassy and the other was that of the CIA. He was quite paranoid on the subject and seemed convinced that we were out to destroy him.

I remember one time in the embassy, we thought it would be a good idea to sit down and put on paper what we thought would happen if anything ever happened to Sihanouk -

who would be the successor. I guess our political officers made a few inquiries around and produced some kind of a paper. But a few days later, the editorial in the leading newspaper said the United States was looking for a successor for Sihanouk. Sihanouk himself had written this editorial and, of course, felt that this was another evidence that we were out to displace him.

The day I arrived in Cambodia, a member of the National Assembly had been executed for alleged complicity with the CIA.

Several weeks before I arrived, another incident took place which had some influence on the general atmosphere. A big present had arrived for the Queen, bearing a card of the American contractor who had been building the new highway from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville on the ocean. While the chief of protocol was opening the present, the Queen went to another room for a moment, and when she returned, the chief of protocol had been blown up. It was a bomb concealed in the package. Of course, while anything so obvious should not have suggested American complicity, nevertheless, there were many who felt that we might have been involved in that attempted assassination of the Queen.

Then a few months after I arrived, the text of a letter in the alleged handwriting of the former foreign minister who had defected and was living abroad in exile and appeared in the Indian magazine “Blitz”. The letter was allegedly written to my predecessor and implied a very close relationship between the two and complicity of the two in plotting the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk. The ex-minister asked him to thank the ambassador for his help, and wished him well.Our ambassador, Bill Trimble, heard that the letter was going to be reproduced in the Prince's newspaper the next day. He flew to Angkor Wat, where the Prince was staying at the moment, and confronted him with this report. The Prince acknowledged it was so. Finally, although he wouldn't agree not to publish it - indeed he did publish it the next day - he did permit a counter-argument to appear in the press. Well, we brought in a handwriting expert to show that this was a forgery, and while he was convinced that it was I don't think we ever really convinced the Cambodians because it

was very, very well done. The only place where the fabricators of the letter failed was in knowing that my predecessor had left Cambodia. Obviously, if they had been the close friends that the letter suggested, the writer would have known that my predecessor had many weeks before left the country.

So we lived in an uncertain atmosphere. But it was a beautiful country, and we used to enjoy the seashore. The Prince was extremely good in taking chiefs of mission or acting chiefs of mission around the country in his DC-3 as he inaugurated projects, and he had a great flair and a great sense of taste. If we inaugurated an American-financed school one day, we would have luncheon and would be flown out, and drink champagne, make speeches. Then the next day it would be balanced by a Soviet or a Chinese project in which flattering remarks would, of course, be voiced.

So it gave us a chance to see quite a bit of the country, under really a very remarkable leader, whom I have always admired much more so, I think, than most of my contemporaries. As I say, I think I found Cambodia the most fascinating of the posts.

I would call Turkey the country where I feel most at home. I speak some Turkish because of my Roberts College experience, and I traveled extensively in the country. I always found people extremely hospitable and friendly and helpful, and I really feel very comfortable with them. I would say this is my second home.

The Malian people, I think, generally are greatly admired. They're desert people, they haven't been spoiled by the influences that result from being a coastal country. There's a certain nobility about them, a certain ability to survive under extremely rough, tough conditions, and almost everybody who has served in Mali, despite the primitiveness of life and the difficulties of life, ended up by feeling a very warm spot towards Mali and the Malians.

My last post, Cameroon, was perhaps the most comfortable of all of my posts, the most pleasant, because the president, a person whom I admired greatly, was a very measured

kind of person who, as he said, did things “without fanfare.” He made up his mind what he wanted to do, and then suddenly he would do it and the country would be faced with a fait accompli. But as far as relations with the United States were concerned, there were never any unpleasant surprises, never any really unbearable remarks on the radio or in the newspapers. We had no particular crises. I wasn't awakened with night-action telegrams. Had a fine house, could travel a great deal, and it was a very satisfying last post to have.

I haven't spoken very much about Syria. I was there during the Baathi coup d'etat, which overthrew the regime that had broken away from Egypt in 1961. It was an exciting period, the period of the coup d'etat. I was in charge, because the ambassador was away. We had demonstrations in front of the chancery, and I remember one situation in which the crowd was demonstrating out in front and throwing a rock or two at the building, while I escaped over the back wall to make my call on the new prime minister and head of government.

It was a very frustrating period. The new revolutionary command kept its membership secret in the early days. We were kept very much in the dark. Nobody seemed to know who the fomenters of the coup were, who were behind it and who were the personalities involved. But again, I think it was a useful experience to live through a coup of that kind in preparation for difficulties in other parts of the world.

I was in Uganda in 1971 on a visit on the day that Idi Amin staged his coup against President Obote. I found having had the Syrian experience, that it was useful to know what one should do under those coup circumstances.

So in so many different ways, the experiences in one post and certain situations provide guidance for problems that can arise at another post, which gets me rather far away from the subject of what was my favorite post, but one thing seems to lead to another.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you can give me a little bit of your views about current foreign policy, what it should be, what it was in the past, and perhaps some advice for young people who want to go into the Foreign Service as a career.*

MOORE: I suppose what disturbs me most is our tendency to go off with tremendous enthusiasm in pursuit of a policy and expect everybody to go along with it, and then change our attitudes before we have carried it to a conclusion. I'd like to see less fanfare and more solid consistent sticking to a line of action, a policy, that we may think is wise. Of course, I'm mainly interested in the developing world and not the developed world. I think that we also go through extremes. At one period, for example, we were able to maintain AID programs for new emerging countries of Africa. Later, because of budgetary constraints, we had to change the policy and stress regional projects. They really weren't as adapted to the needs of the countries as the other types of programs but we had no choice if we were going to keep any programs going at all. We keep changing the emphasis largely in response to congressional demands. It leads countries, I think, to really wonder how consistent we are and how much they can count on us to continue to provide the sort of help that they're going to need for some time, and help which we, as a major power, are going to have to provide if we're not going to have problems in these countries that will, in the long run, cost us much more than our AID effort at the present time.

I do cringe sometimes at some of the statements that are made that seem to suggest that we discovered the wheel, only to discover that it isn't going to work very well, or it would have been much better if we had approached the problem in a much more quiet and unobtrusive way. But I'm not a real PR type, so perhaps my outlook is wrong.

If I were a Foreign Service officer today, I think I could feel rather discouraged. I think that in our time, certainly many posts, a Foreign Service could aspire to become a chief of mission mainly because they weren't attractive enough for a political appointee, or they were considered to be pretty much in the domain of the career Foreign Service officer.

Now more and more of those, even in some of the smallest countries of Africa, have been given to political appointees, who have, in many cases, no evident qualifications for a particular post. I'd obviously like to see that revert back to a somewhat more normal situation.

I really worry a great deal about the ability of the Foreign Service to attract and to hold quality type of officers who can best serve our country. The purely personal family problems, I think, are becoming quite disturbing. One can recognize that in this day and age where it is common for of two members of the family to earn the family income, it becomes important for the wife to have work when she's abroad, not only because of the money that's involved, but to permit her to pursue her career. From a morale standpoint almost any job provides some diversion and useful activity for wives who otherwise might find some of these posts pretty hard to take.

But for one reason or another, I hear disturbing reports of the change in the activities of American missions abroad, where the emphasis used to be on contacts with the local population, contacts nurtured through representational activities, particularly in the home. Today many working or non-working wives seem to feel they have no responsibility to the Service which means that the entertaining and the informal contacts that are so important have been largely neglected. Increasingly, Americans tend to live in somewhat of a ghetto atmosphere. The security problems, which are much greater than they were in our day, contribute to this. But I do feel that our people are missing a very great deal. I would hope that as time goes on and perhaps women feel more secure in their place, that they'll be willing to give the type of help and support to their husbands and to the post that used to be the case. Of course, there were always abuses in the past. But I think so often wives are missing out on what could be very satisfying experiences. If wives are unhappy or unwilling to go to posts, it obviously affects the ability or the willingness of the male officer to accept some of the posts. Our service is going to be seriously affected by that. I don't have the answer to it, however. I'm sorry.

*Q: From the standpoint of education, how do you think an aspiring Foreign Service officer should try to educate himself?*

MOORE: I don't have, certainly, any answers for it. I know that when I took the oral exams, as I say, happily, I didn't have to take the written, because I don't think I could have passed them at the time. But we were always told there was no particular preparation, but to read The New York Times every day. I, myself, would like to see a liberal arts preparation for Foreign Service officers so that they have a broader appreciation of life, and not just focused too narrowly on any particular subject. It's good to be well read and to be widely read. Then, of course, as one enters the Service, there are various possibilities for advanced training, more specialized training, as one decides what particular course and path to follow as a Foreign Service officer. But I favor the more rounded education, rather than the highly focused one.

*Q: Do you think it's still a good career?*

MOORE: I guess so. I think a lot depends. It seems rather trite to say it, but I think a lot depends on what kind of a wife you have and how willing she is. I think the male officer finds life in some of these posts, most of these posts, very interesting and satisfying, but if he has an unhappy family or an unhappy wife at home, this can make all the difference in the world. We've got to somehow or other meet this particular problem.

But it is discouraging, particularly as more of the chiefs of mission posts seem to be going to political appointees, particularly those posts that might have been within the reach normally of officers.

I've certainly found it extremely interesting, and I can't imagine how I could have stayed in New York Bank and enjoyed life and my career nearly as much as has been the actual case as a Foreign Service officer.

*Q: Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much.*

MOORE: Thank you.

*Q: Very interesting, very worthwhile. Thank you.*

End of interview